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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM AND
IN RE R.A.1
BY BRYN D. POWELL
The occurrence of violence against women 2 is a common
thread that is woven across cultures, regardless of age, socio-
economic conditions, religion or educational opportunities.
3
Domestic violence4 remains one of the most prevalent forms of
violence against women, as shown by the World Health
Organization's estimate that in most countries between 20% to
50% of women are domestically abused.5  Despite many state
governments and the United Nations ("U.N.") condemning
domestic violence as a human rights violation,6 domestic violence
continues to be directed at an increasing number of women. With
an increase in domestic abuse, there have been a growing number
In re R.A., 22 I & N Dec. 906 (BIA 1999), vacated by the Attorney General
S2001), remanded to BIA (2005).
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104, U.N. GAOR, 85 th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1993) ("'[V]iolence
against women' means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty,
whether occurring in public or in private life.")3 Women and Violence (1996), available at http://www.un.org/rights/
dpi 1772e.htm (last visited February 15, 2005).
4 U.N. ESCOR, 52d Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53 (1996) ("[Defining
domestic violence] as violence that occurs within the private sphere, generally
between individuals who are related through intimacy, blood, or law. Despite
the apparent neutrality of the term, domestic violence is nearly always a gender-
specific crime, perpetrated by men against women.").
Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls, United Nations Children's Fund,
Innocent Digest, No. 6 (2000), citing Violence Against Women, World Health
Organization, FRH/WHD/97.8 (1999); Violence Against Women, World Health
Organization (1996).
6 See Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on
Women, 15 September 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 (1995) and
A/CONF. 177/20/Add. 1 (1995); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res.
44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
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of women seeking to immigrate to the United States ("U.S.") under
the justification of gender-related asylum.7 Unfortunately, in In re
R.A., the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") categorically
refused to grant asylum based solely on a woman being
domestically abused.8 Specifically, it reasoned that domestic abuse
was not enough to constitute persecution of a member of a
particular social group. 9 But, Attorney General Ashcroft's recent
remanding of In re R.A. back to the BIA with instructions to apply
finalized Department of Justice ("DOJ") rules, coupled with
increased governmental and non-governmental pressure to grant
R.A. asylum, indicates that there may be a shift in this paradigm.
The U.S. currently has five ways in which women can
apply for residency in an attempt to avoid continued domestic
abuse. These different channels include (1) self-petitioning for
lawful permanent residency under the Violence Against Women
Act ("VAWA"),' (2) petitioning for cancellation from removal
proceedings with a VAWA waiver, (3) utilizing the battered
spouse waiver, (4) petitioning for a crime victim visa (U visa)
and/or (5) applying for gender-based asylum. In all but the fifth
category, there are extensive requirements involved in petitioning
for residency. For example, to petition under the VAWA waiver a
woman must prove (1) she was abused in the U.S., (2) by her U.S.
citizen or legal permanent resident spouse, parent, or parent of
their child, (3) she has legally resided in the U.S. for more than
three years, and (4) she will face extreme hardship if deported.
Gender-based asylum on the other hand, is the most
generally defined category although historically, it has also been
the most difficult to satisfy. In order to qualify for residency under
the gender-based asylum provision, a woman must show she was
(1) abused in her home country and subsequently fled to the U.S.,
or (2) abused in the U.S. by someone from the same country.
More specifically, under INA §208 a woman can apply for asylum
only if she is unwilling or unable to return to her country "because
7 Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY, 946 (5th ed. 2003).
822 1 & N Dec. 906.
9Id.




of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion,"'  thereby meeting the requirement of
"refugee" under INA § 101 (a)(42)(A). In order for a petitioner to
meet the "on account of' requirement, she must provide evidence
that she is fearful of being harmed by an individual specifically
because she has one or more of the above five characteristics. 
2
The most difficult part of meeting these requirements is proving
that women who have been domestically abused are members of a
particular social group.
In In re R.A., Rodi Adali Alvarado Pena ("R.A.") fled to
the U.S. from Guatemala allegedly due to ten years of continued
domestic violence from her husband, who was a former soldier in
the Guatemalan military. Some of the physical and sexual abuse
she testified to included repeated beatings, being pistol whipped,
having her head pushed through glass windows, and being kicked
in the spine when she refused to have an abortion which resulted in
her jaw being dislocated and on a number of other occasions
caused her to bleed severely.14 She also testified to repeated rapes
and forced sodomy. 15 R.A. unsuccessfully sought protection from
the Guatemalan police who refused to enforce three separate
summonses her husband had ignored. 16  They also failed to
respond to R.A.'s calls to their headquarters on two occasions. 17 In
addition, the Guatemalan Courts would not grant R.A. a divorce
without the consent of her husband. R.A. further testified that she
was unaware of any organizations, other than the police, that could
assist her. With no other available alternatives, R.A. chose to flee
to Texas in May 1995.18
After entering the U.S., the Immigration and Naturalization
I INA § 101(a)(2)(A); see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
12 Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481.
1322 I & N Dec. 906.
14Id. at 908-09.
15Id. at 908.
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Service ("INS") 19 detained R.A.. She subsequently faced
deportation proceedings for entering for the U.S. without an
inspection, a deportable violation under INS §241(a)(1)(B). In
response to her pending deportation, R.A. applied for political
asylum and her petition was granted by the Immigration Court in
September 1996.20 The court held that R.A. qualified for asylum
because she was being persecuted for her political opinion and
membership in a particular social. group. The judge specifically
stated that R.A.'s social group consisted of "Guatemalan women,
who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male
domination." 2' R.A.'s political opinion was established to be her
opposition to the male domination of her as a woman.
22
The U.S. appealed the Immigration Court's decision to the
BIA and in 1999 a divided BIA reversed the Immigration Court's
holding.23 The BIA found that R.A. had not been persecuted for
her political opinion or her membership in any particular social
group, despite their finding that she had been persecuted by her
husband and the gender-related abuse was likely to continue if she
returned to Guatemala. 24 Writing for the majority, Board Member
Filippu quickly dismissed the argument that R.A. was being
persecuted for her political opinion because she had not shown any
indication that her husband's abuse was motivated by her political
views, rather it occurred almost daily regardless of R.A.'s personal
beliefs. More troubling was the majority's analysis of what
constitutes a particular social group.
Noting non-binding Ninth Circuit precedents which would
disqualify R.A. from asylum,25 the Board began its analysis by
finding fault with the Immigration Court's abstract definition of a
social group. It stated that in order for R.A. to qualify for asylum
19 The INS is now a part of the Department of Homeland Security.
20 In re R.A., 22 I & N Dec. at 907.




25 Id. at 917-18, citing Li v. NS, 92 F.3d 985 (9th Cir, 1996); Sanchez-Trujillo
v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9 th Cir. 1986).
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she must prove that "Guatemala women who have been involved
intimately with Guatemalan male companions who believe that
women are to live under male domination" is a "societal faction,'
26
like nationality, political opinion, race and religion. Distinguishing
In re Kasinga, the Board continued by stating that R.A. was not a
member of a social group because she failed to show that the use
of domestic violence against women is a Guatemalan societal
attribute and not merely a personal characteristic of her husband.28
The Board showed its reluctance in expanding the definition of a
social group and was adamant that government inaction is
insufficient to constitute refugee status.29 The court asserted that
even if R.A. was considered a member of a particular social group,
she had not adequately shown that her husband had persecuted or
attempted to persecute anyone else within her social group.3 °
After being denied asylum by the BIA, R.A. sought
Attorney General Reno's certification for review of her case by the
Ninth Circuit. At the same time, the DOJ responded to In re R.A.,
by issuing proposed rules that clarified the asylum requirements.3'
The proposed rules state that:
[W]hen evaluating whether an applicant has met his
or her burden of proof to establish that the harm he
or she suffered or fears is "on account of' a
protected characteristic, '[b]oth direct and
circumstantial evidence may be relevant to the
inquiry.' The rule further provides that '[e]vidence
that the persecutor seeks to act against other
individuals who share the applicant's protected
characteristic is relevant and may be considered but
shall not be required.'
32
26 In re R.A., 22 I & N Dec. at 918.
2721 1 & N Dec. 357 (1996).
28 In re R.A., 22 I & N Dec. at 919.
29 Id. at 922.
30 Id.
31 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588 (proposed
December 7, 2000).
32 Id. at 76593.
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Attorney General Reno remanded the case in 2001, pending
finalization of the proposed federal rules.3 3  Then in 2003,
Attorney General Ashcroft mandated that BIA certify the case to
him for review.
During the two years Attorney General Ashcroft has been
considering In re R.A., immigration courts have sidestepped
directly addressing the issue of whether domestic abuse itself can
constitute membership in a particular social group. Yet, courts
have recognized that persecution within domestic relationships can
be enough to warrant asylum. For example, in In re S-A-, 34 a
Moroccan woman was abused by her father for failure to adhere to
her father's interpretation of the Muslim faith. The Immigration
Court granted S-A- asylum because she was persecuted for her
religious beliefs35, although the violence against her could also be
classified as domestic abuse. Similarly, in In re Kasinga36 the
Immigration Court applied the immutability standard set forth in In
re Acosta,37 to hold that Kasinga was a member of a social group
which consisted of young women who had not had female genital
mutilation and who were also members of the Tchamba-Hunsuntu
Tribe. Kasinga's fear of violence and female genital mutilation
was enough to constitute refugee status.
38
The DOJ, Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and
Congress also appear to be more willing to follow the lead of the
U.N. and countries like Canada and the United Kingdom, in
granting asylum based on gender-related violence.39 In In re R.A.,
DHS has been active in petitioning the Attorney General to grant
33The DOJ's proposed rules now come under the jurisdiction of the Department
of Homeland Security.
34 22 1 & N Dec. 1328 (2000).
Id. at 1336.
36 21 I & N Dec. 357 (1996).
37 19 1 & N Dec. 211 (1985).
38 In re Kasinga, 21 1 & N Dec. at 357.
39 See, e.g., supra note 6; Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, 2 A.C.
629 (H.L. 1999); Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another Ex Parte
Shah, 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1999); Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Immigration and Refugee Board
of Canada (Nov. 25, 1996).
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R.A. asylum.40  Similarly, Congress and more than 180 non-
governmental organizations have petitioned the Attorney General
to grant R.A. asylum.4'
Despite petitioning efforts by DHS, U.S. Congress, U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees and other non-governmental
422organizations, on January 21, 2005, Attorney General Ashcroft
remanded In re R.A. to BIA. Although it is disappointing that
Attorney General Ashcroft did not take the opportunity to grant
R.A. asylum, he also did not deny her asylum, which many had
speculated he would do. Rather, his order included the instruction
that BIA should reconsider the case in light of DHS's (formally
DOJ's) finalized rules outlining what constitutes a social group.
However, the Attorney General's unprecedented delay in deciding
In re R.A.43 should serve as a warning that the public needs to be
diligent in demanding prompt and increased protection for
domestic violence victims, both in the U.S. and abroad.
40 See Dep't of Homeland Sec.'s Position on Respondent's Eligibility for Relief,
In re R.A., 22 I & N Dec. 906 (1999) (No. A 73-753-922).
41 See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance of the Decision of the
Immigration Judge, In re R.A., 22 I & N Dec. 906 (1999) (No. A 73-753-922);
Letter from Hilary Rodham Clinton, et. al., U.S. Senate, to John Ashcroft, U.S.
Attorney General (June 16, 2004) (on file with the author); Letter from Carolyn
B. Maloney, et. al., U.S. Congress, to John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General
(May 13, 2004) (on file with the author).
2 See supra notes 38-40.
22 I & N Dec. 906.
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